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The Hidden Regulation of Carbon Markets 
Lisa Knoll ∗ 
Abstract: »Die versteckte Regulierung des Marktes für CO2-Emissionen«. This 
article tracks the creation and maintenance of markets for emission rights and 
the role that law-creation plays within this process. From a recent example of a 
market creation – the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) –, insights 
will be gained about the intrinsic and fundamental connections between mar-
ket creation and bureaucratization. This process unfolds in a paradoxical way: 
The free-market hypothesis is, in fact, creating a demand for regulation, ad-
ministration, and control. Law creation that is informed by the free-market hy-
pothesis (the Law and Economics School in general, the EU Directive as a spe-
cific case), separates the “inside of the market” from the “outside of the 
market.” This, firstly, causes a need for extra-administration at the “outside of 
the market” in order to resolve the uncertainty that emanates from the self-
imposed requirement of leaving “the market itself” unregulated. And it, sec-
ondly, exposes the "rational actor” to an open and uncertain situation, which 
then leads to private regulative and administrative attempts at the “inside of 
the market.” 
Keywords: Conventions, law, bureaucracy, European Union Emission Trading 
System, free-market hypothesis, efficiency. 
1.  Introduction1 
Emissions markets are a scientific-regulatory project born in the 1970s in the 
US. Later, in the 1990s, market-based regulative mechanisms took off as a joint 
effort of the world community, which decided to fight a crucial threat to man-
kind: global warming. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, a turning point in glob-
al history, where the world’s belief in bureaucracy and command-and-control 
regulatory mechanisms had been overly frustrated, mankind and democracy 
seemed to be better off with market mechanisms. Emissions markets thus rep-
resent the vision and the hope of leaving State bureaucracy and command-and-
control mechanisms behind.  
                                                             
∗  Lisa Knoll, Institute for Sociology, University of Hamburg, Allende-Platz 1, 20146 Hamburg, 
Germany; lisa.knoll@wiso.uni-hamburg.de. 
1  I want to thank the editors of this HSR Special Issue, Anita Engels, Benjamin Stephan, 
Miguel Rodriguez, and Daniel Schluchter for their helpful comments.  
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Today, after four decades of “in vivo experiments” (Callon 2009, 536) with 
emission markets, more and more economists criticize the administrative burden, 
and the additional workload (in terms of transaction costs) that emission markets 
have caused (Mallard 2009; Jaraite et al. 2010); more and more observers would 
today prefer taxes over trading schemes (Wittneben 2009). It seems that the in-
evitable bureaucracy and work intensity of carbon markets (together with the 
problem of ongoing over-allocation) has caused some level of disillusion.  
This article tries to understand how the free-market hypothesis in market 
creation and law design systematically produces what it wants to avoid. The 
argument is that the concept of the self-regulating market causes a hidden need 
for regulation at the “outside” and at the “inside” of the market. The separation 
between the economic and the non-economic in theory building is an artificial 
division with extensive practical and regulative consequences. The French 
pragmatic approach of economics of conventions aims at overcoming this 
analytical divide. It therefore offers a promising research perspective for under-
standing how market creation and maintenance unfolds.  
Law creation is understood as a compromising attempt (Boltanski and Thé-
venot 2006) where the contradictions between different conventional worlds 
are bridged and merged (e.g. between the civic, the industrial, and the market in 
case of energy taxes). Still, at the moment when the free-market hypothesis is 
introduced in the process of law creation, “the market” appears to be separated. 
The market itself is excluded from direct regulation; the regulation is built 
around the “pure” market, so to speak. This happens in emissions trading 
schemes which are set against command-and-control mechanisms and against 
State-dependent taxes based on a general assumption of market efficiency (Lane 
2012). It is argued that the EU Emissions Trading Directive cannot be analyzed 
as a compromise in a straightforward sense, since it regulates the “outside of the 
market.” Trading, “the inside of the market,” is left unregulated. This is a sepa-
rating construct based on the distinction between “artificial law” versus “natu-
ral market.” The construct, in so doing, separates a sphere exposed to societal 
construction from a sphere of natural condition. Natural conditions cannot be 
regulated, but impose their facticity. These movements into naturalness in 
market creation and maintenance may be analyzed in Boltanski’s (2012) terms 
as pragmatic regime changes from regimes of justice and fairness (construc-
tion), into a regime evading social construction, which, in its extreme form, is a 
regime of force and violence (nature). This for example happens, when it is 
argued that States should not intervene in markets, even though the market is 
constructed from the very beginning.  
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2.  Law, Economics, and (Emission) Markets 
The relationship between markets and their regulation is ambivalent. On the 
one hand, markets promise to unfold in a self-regulating way when freed from 
regulatory obstacles (laissez-faire), and, on the other hand, markets are de-
pendent on law and regulation defining and securing property rights, contracts, 
and competitiveness. This ambivalence stems from the free-market hypothesis 
which separates “the market” from the regulation that surrounds it. For eco-
nomic sociologists, this separation is a theoretical artefact. Max Weber’s work 
on the lex mercatoria documents the co-evolution of commerce and law 
(Swedberg 2003, 200-2). And Karl Polanyi (1944) showed that free competi-
tion-based markets did not evolve from natural local markets, but from foreign 
trade that was, due to its uncertainty, heavily dependent on State formation. 
The expansion of markets over society – the creation of domestic markets – 
required the intervention and the expansion of the State. Even modern financial 
markets are highly regulation-dependent, though this regulation is more and 
more provided by private institutions (Carruthers 2012). For economic sociolo-
gists, the law is an “organic part” of markets (Swedberg 2003, 192), and “eve-
rything economic also has a legal dimension” (Ford and Swedberg 2009, 3; see 
also Edelman and Stryker 2005). Considering this, the theoretical creation and 
maintenance of the economic artefact of separation deserves a closer look.  
The economic ambivalence concerning regulation (in)dependency is visible 
in the establishment of markets for pollution rights. To economists, pollution is a 
negative externality. Economists, instead of demanding or prohibiting certain 
technologies, prefer an indirect regulatory approach: the manipulation of the price 
system. If one considers agents to be free, reacting to their environment in an 
utilitarian way, always detecting (even calculating) what would leave them better 
off, the obvious solution to any social problem is the manipulation of the struc-
ture of incentives. The unintended side effect of this manipulation is an expansion 
of regulative devices, and a growing demand for structural knowledge that tells 
the regulator where to manipulate and which regulating screw to adjust. (This, of 
course, is unsatisfactory for economists believing in the free-market hypothesis.)  
When economists started thinking about economic externalities, and how 
they may be introduced into national accounts, they first suggested the taxation 
of harmful emissions and other side effects of economic action (Pigou 1920). 
Since taxation is a witness to the dependency on bureaucracy, economists start-
ed thinking about how to avoid this external regulator. It was Ronald Coase 
who turned the problem of pollution into “a problem of a reciprocal nature” 
(Coase 1960, 2). He showed that the problem of externalities can be left to the 
market actors themselves. The pollution problem should be resolved between 
rational contractors directly without any intermediary in cases where transac-
tion costs are low. The one that has been harmed may compensate the one that 
pollutes so that he may resign from his harmful activities. Or, the one that 
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pollutes may compensate the one that has been harmed. The latter version 
depends on the existence of a legal liability (MacKenzie 2009b). With his 
attempt to design markets according to assumptions of economic efficiency, 
Coase is the founding father of the Law and Economics School (Posner 1975, 
1981). The Law and Economics School calculates the effects of the law on eco-
nomic efficiency on the basis of the rational economic actor and a state of equi-
librium, so that the law can be designed accordingly. The attempt of this perspec-
tive is to decide whether situations can be left over to the free market or whether 
situations would need a certain kind of regulation. The baseline assumption is the 
distinction between a natural market and an artificial law, where the latter is 
acceptable only when markets fail (Edelman and Stryker 2005, 527-8).  
The economic invention of emissions trading drove these thoughts even fur-
ther. The economist J. H. Dales (1968) compared three different ways of im-
plementing a policy concerning the problem of water pollution at the Great 
Lakes in Canada: regulation, subsidization, and a disposal fee. He argues that, in 
any case, the society would pay the rent for the pollution problem and that it is 
therefore necessary to search for an overall efficient solution. Companies would 
always pass their additional costs over to the customers, and in case of subsidies, 
taxes would need to rise. From this assumption, Dales deduces that “it seems 
more realistic to deal with society as a whole, rather than with groups,” like 
single factories that may be accused to be guilty of water pollution alone:  
Here, however, we are dealing with what economists call ‘general equilibri-
um’ situations, in which we are all simultaneously producers and consumers, 
polluters and pollutees. It is then true that, no matter who passes the money to 
whom in the first place, we all pay in the end. (Whether we pay equally de-
pends on a host of factors, such as the taxation system, individual consump-
tion habits, and so on; but there will be individual discrepancies in the burden 
of pollution control no matter how the control is implemented) (Dales 1968, 
83; emphasis in original). 
For Dales, “everyone pollutes and everyone pays for polluting” (Dales 1968); 
this makes the question of how to regulate environmental pollution a question 
of “justice” (Dales 1968, 85): we are called to minimize the overall costs of 
pollution control in the name of society as a whole. What Dales promises to 
avoid by emissions trading is a “trial-and-error pricing” (Dales 1968, 82) and 
an administrative burden which he ascribes to the other three mechanisms.  
The Pollution Rights market will […] simplify administrative problems by 
removing the necessity of anyone’s deciding what pollution charges should be 
[…]. The administrative simplicity of the scheme is certainly one of its main 
attractions (Dales 1968, 97). 
This is astonishing, since Dales mentions the many regulation-intensive condi-
tions pollution markets are dependent on: there is a necessity of measuring the 
tons of waste, dropped by different polluters; there is the necessity of defining a 
scheme of equivalence to make different qualities of waste comparable and 
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interchangeable; there is a necessity of controlling the polluters’ data and the 
data of the ones that control the polluters data; and there is the necessity of a 
trial and error pricing to get the market started in the first place. There is a 
necessity for market making (Abolafia 1996) – Dales writes: “the WCB [water 
control board] acts like a specialist on organized stock exchanges; as a buyer of 
last resort” (Dales 1968, 96), which implicated regulatory interventions when 
prices are too high or too low (compared to a baseline that has to be defined 
and monitored as well). These are the “technopolitical ‘nuts and bolts’ of the 
design of markets and of allocation mechanisms” (MacKenzie 2009b, 176) with-
out which emission markets would not work. Still, these nuts and bolts remain 
hidden in the descriptions of how pollution markets work. In the following cita-
tion Dales invites us to think of how the pollution market, he has in mind, would 
work. It is an intellectual game full of assumptions and preconditions. 
Let us try to set up a ‘market’ in ‘pollution rights.’ The [water control; LK] 
board starts the process by creating a certain number of Pollution Rights, each 
Right giving whoever buys it the right to discharge one equivalent ton of 
wastes into natural water during the current year. Suppose that the current lev-
el of pollution is roughly satisfactory. On this assumption, if half a million 
tons of wastes are currently being dumped into the water system, the Board 
would issue half a million Rights. All waste dischargers would then be re-
quired to buy whatever number of Rights they need; if a factory dumps 1000 
tons of waste per year it will have to buy 1000 Rights. To put the market into 
operation, let us say that the Board decides to withhold 5 per cent of the 
Rights in order to allow for the growth of production and population during 
the first year, and therefore offers 475,000 Rights for sale. Since demand is for 
500,000, the Rights will immediately command some positive price – say, 10 
cents each (Dales 1968, 93). 
On the basis of these assumptions and preconditions, the market situation ap-
pears straightforward: the trading system would reduce the overall mitigation 
costs for society, because emissions would be reduced where mitigation is cheap-
est. But, as Michel Callon put it: “[a]s soon as [economic language; LK] leaves 
that world of textbooks and students, which suits it so well, it gets into trouble” 
(Callon 2007, 330). This is why we have to study “economists in the wild” (Cal-
lon 2007, 338) or economic “in vivo experiments” (Callon 2009, 536) like car-
bon markets. But before tackling the problem of real-world carbon markets the 
analytical perspective on market construction and maintenance is outlined. 
3.  Establishing Equivalence, Building a Compromise, 
Neglecting Humanity 
In this article, the problem of market creation and the inherent role of law is 
addressed with the help of analytical tools provided by the French pragmatic 
approach of economics of conventions. Markets, from this perspective, are 
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analyzed as organized arrangements (Favereau 1989), urging for stabilization 
and regulation. Thus, economic coordination “requires an absence” of the 
separation between “economic” and “non-economic” dimensions (Storper and 
Salais 1997, 19; emphasis in original). Markets are, rather, collective and mul-
tifaceted arrangements where the problem of quality is resolved on a moment-
to-moment basis. In order to produce, to sell, or to buy a product or a com-
modity, traders and other people engaged in the market need to establish a form 
of certainty at least in a rudimentary way. This certainty is established via 
formats of equivalence (conventions) that help to qualify the situation and thus 
render it decidable. The Keynesian problem of uncertainty is at the core of this 
perspective. It leads to the question of how things and people can be coordinat-
ed from situation to situation and how this coordination unfolds.  
In order to overcome uncertainty, people invest in forms. The notion of the 
form covers a “range of form-giving activities” (Thévenot 1984, 2), which are 
stabilized by implements that may be “of a conventional technological kind, or 
are of a legal, scientific or other nature” (Thévenot 1984, 15). These materially 
equipped formats are costly investments (Thévenot 1984, 6); they are not easy 
to achieve, because they cover conflicts and contradictions. They establish 
equivalence over a diverse, heterogeneous, and thus, uncertain situation, which 
makes them so worthy for coordination. Forms of equivalence establish a spe-
cific order that allows ranking things and people accordingly. It leads to a tre-
mendous gain in coordination and decidability. Once a form of equivalence is 
established, very different situations can be approached in an objectified way. 
There is no need to think about local particularities any more. They now can be 
treated as exceptions not bothering the form.2  
In modern society a plurality of these forms of equivalence exists. These 
forms are “objectified or materially ‘equipped’” and “the equipment derives 
from and contributes to the fixing and diffusion of a form” (Thévenot 1984, 
15). In On Justification, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) distinguish the six 
most public formats of equivalence that render things and people objective and 
worthy in their own specific ways (industry, market, civic, domestic, inspired, 
opinion). These forms of equivalence are represented by a specific assortment 
of objects that act as witnesses of the form. In so called “tests,” by either rear-
ranging things and people according to a form, or by criticizing a form by 
holding it against the objects of a situation, people frequently check out what 
the collective state of the situation is (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 131). The 
forms of equivalence cover historical traces of conflicts and controversies that 
have been civilized in each of these forms of equivalence in their own specific 
ways (Boltanski 2012, 75). They have been once created by compromising 
attempts in which contradictions have been overworked over decades of histo-
                                                             
2  This is what happens in statistical classification, too (Boltanski and Thévenot 1983; Desrosières 
1991). 
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ry. This historical perspective is elaborated in The New Spirit of Capitalism, 
where Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) show how a new form of equivalence 
emerges from a compromising attempt, which is now representing an own 
grammar of worth: the project-based polis. Boltanski and Chiapello refer to 
Louis Dumont’s work, which shows that the ideology of individualism 
emerged from compromise-building with older cultural forms (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005, 20-1).  
This compromising historicity of conventions is the reason why these forms 
of equivalence will never erase uncertainty fully. Boltanski (2011, 57) refers to 
the distinction between risk and uncertainty by Frank Knight in order to explain 
this point. When uncertainty is turned into a calculable risk, this does not impli-
cate full control over the event. But it renders a situation approachable and decid-
able. The same holds true for conventions. It means that conventions are always 
under construction and frequent renewal of the form investment is needed. 
Very often, such attempts of testing lead into conflicts between different 
forms of equivalence, which may be overcome by a compromise. Building a 
compromise helps overcoming the ambiguity by undoing the contradiction 
between elements stemming from different conventional worlds without set-
tling the conflict through recourse to an explicit test (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006, 277). For example, the incommensurability of the industrial world and 
the market world is encountered in economic theory-building “when time is 
introduced as a factor in market relations” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 194). 
An example to illustrate this time dependency in economic coordination is the 
portfolio selection theory invented by Markowitz (1952). Portfolio selection 
addresses the problem of future price developments and its optimization, and thus 
the problem of risk that is inherited by a company or by an investor. It demands 
tracking the price developments of each asset a company holds, and it thus de-
mands future estimations and hedging strategies that help tracking price devel-
opments over time. This is in sharp contrast to the market order, which establish-
es a here and now situation of exchange (an exchange that is facilitated by the 
form of individual competition). The portfolio selection theory and portfolio 
management practices, accordingly, thus, need to be understood as compromising 
attempts between the market and the industrial equivalence (Knoll 2012).  
The same holds true for the law that is constructed in order to stabilize and 
form market situations. The law as a “very site of compromise” (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005, 400) bridges requirements from different worlds of equiva-
lence. The law is in motion because it overworks and undoes contradictions. 
Thus, it may be decisive to understand the concrete regulatory compromises 
that are built into pollution markets. The economist Pigou (1920), who dealt 
with the problem of negative externalities in environmental pollution, argued 
that the State as an external regulator should define a price for pollution (taxa-
tion). In taxation, the market world and the civic world maintain a compromise, 
where State regulation defines the financial incentive to stimulate rational 
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actors’ choices. In this compromise, the role of the State is clearly defined as 
the one who sets the price in order to achieve a certain steering effect (indus-
try). The price appears to be a political mechanism, designed to regulate politi-
cal goals on the basis of economic assumptions of agency. Thus, the price has 
to be set by a group of experts and negotiated politically. For a company, this 
means that in the end of a reporting year taxes may have to be paid according 
to the amount of energy that has been used, for example.  
This compromise is challenged when law makers seek to keep the core of 
the market (the price mechanism) free from regulation. Then, market coordina-
tion is treated as if there was no regulation dependency at the core of the mar-
ket transaction (“inside the market”). The core of the market is treated as a pure 
entity that is unfolding as a natural mechanism, which is in its best condition 
when left untouched. This is the moment where the regulative compromise of 
market creation is challenged and the market form is put on pure and independ-
ent grounds.  
Still, in the light of reality tests, such attempts of purification must get into 
trouble. Reality strikes back, as we know from Callon (2007, 323). In order to 
establish the market as a pure entity, it is necessary to change the regime of 
action. Contradictions or conflicts can be very well ignored or neglected. This 
is why Boltanski (2012, 70) argues in favor of a distinction between a “regime 
of peace in fairness,” which is built upon tacit equivalence and the “regime of 
dispute in justice,” which requires explicit critique and justification in the light 
of equivalence. If one moves from the regime of dispute in justice towards the 
regime of peace in fairness, the tacit use of objects is required, of objects that 
demand their silent functionality and rationality. This is a state of being in 
which actors deny the possibility of an alternative evaluation and where they 
“black box” the historicity involved in conventions (Boltanski 2012, 75). From 
this regime of peace in fairness, it is only a small step into the regime of vio-
lence, which is “inaccessible to language” (Boltanski 2012, 73). In violence 
people are not any longer humans, but objects that are rearranged by the  
inhumane harshness of forces of nature. For the constraint of things, when it is 
no longer tolerated, can appear as imposed violence; this happens when one 
denounces the tacit violence of the established order, of regulation, law, tech-
nology, and so on (Boltanski 2012, 75). 
The “regime of dispute in violence” does not depend on equivalence and the 
conventional achievements of mankind any longer. It means acting as if there 
was no humanity, but only things and forces involved. It means neglecting the 
conventional (constructed) quality of the situation. Thévenot argues that these 
moments can be analyzed as an engagement in the plan, which strives for 
“governing by objective objectives” (Thévenot 2012, 8), or an engagement 
where people are “relying with blind faith on the marker of the guarantee,” 
neglecting the sacrifice of the market form (Thévenot 2011, 36). To me it is 
important that we observe a naturalization that is applied with “pragmatic 
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versatility” (Thévenot 2001, 407). Regulators and other market observers move 
from the regime of construction, where the objects stemming from different 
worlds are put together and equivalence is crafted, into a regime where this 
ambivalence and human construction is neglected all of a sudden. Economic 
law makers, neglecting the construction of markets that are constructed (like 
markets for pollution rights obviously are), and referring to the “nature of the 
market,” perform an argumentative movement that can be analyzed as a regime 
change from the conventional regimes of justice (were the free-market hypoth-
esis fails to pass any reality test) into a regime of natural forces (were the free-
market turns to be a biological constant). 
Such an analytical perspective can be applied to the debate whether the Eu-
ropean Commission should “repair” the European market for emission rights 
and take responsibility for its permanent over allocation. The European trading 
scheme is currently carrying a surplus that “could reach 2 billion allowances by 
2013” (EU Commission 2012). In the forefront of the poll of the European 
parliament on April 16th, 2013, on the question whether the EU Commission 
should “backload” a certain amount of allowances in order to induce scarcity 
(or a less over-allocation), basically two political positions opposed each other 
(Knoll 2013, 67):  
1) The birth defects of the system need to be repaired. Without a significant 
price for carbon there is no climate friendly steering effect. Energy from 
dirty coal combustion gets relatively cheaper compared to clean renewable 
energy and flexible combined heat and power plants that may flank the re-
newable energy mix. The companies that have been investing in coal plants 
get rewarded.  
2) Emissions trading works as it has been planned. That the politically defined 
cap has proofed to be too high indicates a progress in climate change mitiga-
tion, since it means that less greenhouse gases have been emitted than 
planned. The climate does not care whether emissions are reduced due to an 
economic crisis or due to environmental investments. Furthermore, market 
intervention is principally problematic and to be rejected. 
The Commission’s appraisal to backload allowances (position 1) has been 
declined on April 16th with a slight majority. The baseline argument of the op-
ponents (position 2) was that States should not intervene in markets – even so 
they are constructed. This argumentation involves more than just a compromising 
attempt. It is a movement from the compromise (acknowledging the construction 
of the market) into an argument that neglects its construction. To sum up, contra-
dictions involved in market creation can be resolved via compromise-building 
and via neglecting the constructedness – the compromise – of the market. 
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4.   The Hidden Bureaucracy of Carbon Markets. Lessons 
from the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
The following chapters ask about the consequences of such regulatory attempts 
that leave the core of the market unregulated. The European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) is taken as an example for law and market creation. It is the 
first international trading scheme for industrial and energy installations world-
wide (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; Bailey 2010). First, it is shown that the 
European directive, setting up the European market for emission allowances, is 
systematically not addressing the aspect of trading itself. Instead, the contextual 
preconditions of the market are addressed. In order to set up the market for 
emission rights, an administrative bureaucracy is set in place, which secures 
that the core of the market can be left unregulated. This leads to a demand for 
form-investments at the company level in order to overcome the uncertainty 
involved in emissions trading.  
4.1  The EU Directive Regulates the “Outside of the Market” 
The nuts and bolts of the European carbon market are defined in the “DI-
RECTIVE 2003/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowance trading within the Community.” The directive establishes a 
compromising regulative attempt, where climate change is defined as a politi-
cal problem of justice that will be addressed jointly and divided into faire 
shares of reduction targets (civic), by means of measuring, calculating, and 
monitoring industrial emission levels (industry), which are then made tradable 
among single installations that are considered to be rational competitors (mar-
ket). Even so, trading is at the heart of the of the directives purpose; trading is 
the only element that remains unregulated. Trading itself is black boxed in 
economic assumptions of the free market and it is left over to the rational actors 
(the “inside of the market”). 
The “outside of the market,” quite to the contrary, is intensively regulated. A 
competent authority (Art. 18) is required at the national level, which makes 
sure that all installations covered by the European Directive are registered 
participants of the trading scheme, and that all installations establish a monitor-
ing scheme on a yearly basis that is verified by a verifier that first has to be 
accredited by an authority. The national authority is responsible to “harmonise 
communication on the monitoring plan, the annual emission report and the 
verification activities between the operator, the verifier and competent authori-
ties” (Art. 14, 4). The directive defines what categories of industrial and com-
bustion activities are covered by the scheme (Annex I), which greenhouse 
gases are covered (Annex II), how monitoring and reporting of the emission 
levels of each installation “either by calculation or on the basis of measure-
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ment” is to be accomplished (Annex IV), and how the process of verification is 
to be organized (Annex V). It has to be defined who the protagonists of the 
market are, what is to be traded on this market. Demand has to be created via 
monitoring and reporting, self-interest seeking with guile has to be diminished 
by verification and penalties, and transparency has to be established via public 
access to the information of emission levels of each installation (§ 13). In order 
to create liquidity on the market, the sellable good needs to be portioned into 
small and tradable shares: one “tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent,” which is 
defined as “one metric tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) or an amount of any 
other greenhouse gas listed in Annex II with an equivalent global-warming 
potential” (Art. 3, j). Carbon has become the baseline currency into which other 
greenhouse gases can be turned at a fixed exchange rate (MacKenzie 2009a; 
Descheneau 2012). And last but not least, it has to be defined how the tradable 
allowances are distributed, and how many allowances should be allocated for 
free, what share of allowances should be auctioned, and what share of allow-
ances the “market maker” (the European Commission) should keep for new 
entrants (Art. 10a, 7). In order to organize these market-making activities, the 
European trading scheme is portioned into trading phases, ranging from Phase I 
(2005-2007), to Phase II (2008-2012), over to Phase III (2013-2020), with 
Phase IV already envisioned in the European “2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies.”  
The EU Commission states: “The flexibility that trading brings ensures that 
emissions are cut where it costs least to do so” (EU Commission 2014). This 
argument does not account for the regulatory and bureaucratic infrastructure 
needed to bring this “free market flexibility” into existence. The efficiency-
claim (Lane 2012) is based on economic assumptions that address the “inside 
of the market” only. The “inside of the market” has been left unregulated and is 
handed over to the rational actor and its calculative capacities.  
4.2  The “Inside of the Market” is Left Unregulated 
Given the range of regulations that the EU Directive establishes, there remain a 
lot of things unregulated. These are the things that remain hidden in the eco-
nomic assumption of the “rational actor” and “the market,” which are expected 
to operate on their own accounts. First, what is left open is the question of how 
actors, companies or installations could come to an appraisal of their “CO2 
abatement costs.” Only if companies know the cost of reducing one ton of 
carbon equivalent, is it possible to set this cost factor in relation to the market 
price and thus come to a rational decision, which in the end is expected to 
render the whole mechanism efficient on an overall level. The rational agent 
must know if he/she should better reduce emissions in his/her own installation 
park or if it is cheaper to sell or buy emissions on the market. This is not an 
easy-to-decipher item. The percentage of companies answering the question 
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“Are you familiar with your company’s costs of reducing CO2 emissions?” 
with “Yes” is around 30 percent in the consecutive trading years from 2005 to 
2007 in a survey covering companies from four European countries (Engels 
2009, 492). In order to decide whether to sell or buy allowances, or whether to 
reduce emission levels the punctual market situation which may indicate that 
right now, exactly in this moment (market convention), it would be rational to 
sell allowances or invest in carbon mitigation measures; it can be completely 
different in the future (industrial convention). 
Leaving the economic actor alone with this uncertainty, establishes a demand 
for a service industry offering solutions for documentation, calculation and/or 
trading (Engels et al. 2008, 284; 2009, 496). About 20 percent of the European 
companies decided to outsource their emissions trading strategy to a professional 
service provider in the beginning of Phase I (Engels et al. 2008, 283).  
That it is everything but straightforward to design an emissions trading 
strategy show qualitative case studies that have been conducted at 16 European 
companies in four European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark) in 5 industrial sectors (energy, food, refinery, min-
eral, public education, health). The case studies have been conducted between 
December 2007 and June 2008.3 The case studies show that trading can unfold 
in quite different modes (see Table 1). There are companies that take a system-
atic and calculative stance towards emissions trading, and companies that re-
frain from systematization. Companies that developed a systematic trading 
strategy used the language of “optimization,” which refers to the portfolio 
concept aforementioned. Interestingly, “optimization” can be interpreted in 
different ways. The risk-taking variant is oriented towards the price gaps and 
decouples price-developments from the physical demand and production cy-
cles. The risk-avoiding variant is coupling trading decisions closely with the 
demand for emissions rights and with the industrial production cycle. For ex-
ample, one company with a long position in EUAs engaged in systematic sell-
ing (not buying and selling) the superfluous allowances (which is not very risk-
taking, but systematic). It is a company that can predict its demand for emis-
sion rights on a relatively stable basis. It produces dairy products under the 
European milk quota system. This industrial-civic complex renders the gas 
consumption level predictable “one year or two years in front,” as the energy 
sourcing leader of the dairy states. Superfluous allowances can thus be sold, 
which is done on the basis of a systematic price-gap oriented selling strategy 
aiming at revenue maximization.  
                                                             
3  The presented outcomes stem from the research project “A cross-national comparison of 
institutional factors on economic action of companies (exemplified by emission trading),” 
funded by the German Research Council DFG, 2006-2009, grant No. EN 488/2-1, directed by 
Anita Engels at the University of Hamburg. 
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Other companies engaged in trading, which cannot be named “strategy.” Trad-
ing in these cases is not based on a systematic tracking of the demand/price rela-
tion (which is the basis for calculating the CO2 abatement costs). Their trading 
behavior was rather spontaneous and emotional (brave/anxious) and based on 
guesses and speculation.  
One company that kept its superfluous allowances was not able to predict its 
demand for emission rights on such a stable basis, even though it was also 
producing under a political quota system, in this case under the system of Eu-
ropean fishing quotas. Anyhow, the “raw material” in this case of a Danish fish 
meal factory is much less reliable, which makes carbon trading an uncertain 
task. The energy manager of a Danish fish meal factory justifies his trading 
activity (he was not selling any allowance, even though he had more allowanc-
es than he needed):  
It’s because of the fish. […] We are very much dependent on raw material. Eve-
rything done here is based on raw material. And it’s partly political decisions, 
but it’s actually more, well it’s changing from year to year, in some years some 
kind of species are very numerous and some years it’s not. And it’s really, it’s 
really changing a lot (Energy manager of a Danish fish meal factory). 
Even so, in the fishmeal case, the attempt was a calculative one: the unpredict-
ability of the demand situation made the energy manager develop a cautious 
stance towards trading, which in the end left him with a non-decision. He did 
not sell emission rights in the first trading phase. When he was ready to sell, 
the price for carbon has been broken down.  
Table 1: Emissions Trading Behavior in the EU ETS 
Uncertainty/Risk Engagement EUA Short Position EUA Long Position 
systematic transfor-





oriented trading (selling and 
buying) 
no case 
risk-avoiding systematic sourcing strategy 
systematic selling 
strategy (but not 
buying and selling) 
no systematic trans-




spontaneous selling based 
on “gut feeling” 
buying late (speculating on 
break down of price in the 
end of the trading phase) 
early and quick 
selling of superflu-
ous allowances 
anxious  early buying, in order to be on the safe side 
keeping superflu-
ous allowances 
Based on the analysis of 16 company case studies in 4 European countries and 5 industrial 
sectors. 
 
Table 1 shows that trading emission allowances are loaded with uncertainty 
that need to be turned into a decision, which economic actors may achieve on 
quite different calculative and emotional basis. In particular, the calculative and 
systematic variant, which is informed by portfolio management “optimization” 
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is a rather work intensive matter. The rational decision that is left to the intelli-
gence of the market leads to a tremendous work load shifted over to the eco-
nomic actors that are confronted with the impertinence of tracking the “infor-
mation” of the price and to turn this “information” into a rational decision that 
in the end will render the whole market “efficient” (which is in some sectors a 
bigger impertinence than in others; see also Knoll and Engels 2012; Engels and 
Knoll 2013). In a way, the workload of price setting has been handed over from 
the central State and expert groups (as in case of taxation) to the operators of 
roughly 11,000 European installations that now have to track the price infor-
mation and the workload. Decision making in emission markets in many cases 
involves what Michael Power calls a “restless metrological drama at the organ-
izational level […] acted out by accountants, actuaries, economists, consult-
ants” (Power 2004, 767).  
It is true that one aim of the European Commission has been fulfilled: “By 
putting a price on carbon and thereby giving a financial value to each ton of 
emissions saved, the EU ETS has placed climate change on the agenda of com-
pany boards and their financial departments across Europe” (EU Commission 
2014). The awareness has certainly been raised. But it remains an open ques-
tion if and how this awareness for short-term price volatility will lead into 
long-term investments in technological carbon-reduction measures. This link 
between carbon trading and investments in clean technologies and processes is 
completely handed over to the black box of “the market.” 
The European Commission and its role as a “market maker” is a second as-
pect of leaving the “inside of the market” unregulated. In a certain way, the 
European Commission is not acting as a professional financial institution. After 
the first break down of the EUA price in May 2006, after the emission reports 
of all installations had been published the first time, and it got obvious that the 
market is over allocated, dissatisfaction with the European Commission as a 
market maker escalated. The energy trader of a big Danish energy company 
mentioned:  
Compared to other commodity markets, I would say, that one thing definitely 
has to be changed. That is all sorts of politicians coming up with all sorts of 
comments and also leakage of information. It has to be organized like the cur-
rency market like in Europe and the rest of the world. There is only one insti-
tution that can make a decision and make a comment on the market, because 
otherwise you get all sorts of possibilities of misuse of the market. When the 
price went from 23 to 0 Euros, some people in the EU came out with the in-
formation one or two days before it just has been given. And the information 
only went out to some people. Not because they really thought about it, I 
think, just because they didn’t know what they were doing. This still goes on. 
I think there are a lot of people, they did not know what they are doing, politi-
cians in the EU. They don’t know how big impact it has on the market, when 
the information is leaked. That has to be changed. It has to be made illegal to 
come out with information that has such a big impact on the market. When it 
comes to figures for how much has been emitted. These things have to be 
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changed. As you know, in other markets, in the oil markets and stuff, people 
are sitting and looking for the same figures, like how much is in storage, and 
how much is not, what is going to happen and this and that. And now, people 
are trying to find certain points of interest in the CO2 market. But it’s still very 
difficult to know, what to look for at what time, because information flows 
around like it does (Energy trader of a Danish power company). 
This means that markets in pollution rights, like Dales invented them in 1960s, 
political actors like the “water control board”, or in our case the European 
Commission, lack the understanding and the consciousness of what it takes to 
build a financial market. These political institutions lack a well-defined con-
sciousness concerning the fact that the statistical information about overall 
emission levels provided by institutions like the European Environmental 
Agency is of high importance to market analysts. Selective launching of infor-
mation, in “normal” financial markets, is regulated as an infringement against 
the prohibition of insider trading.  
Notwithstanding, the European Commission is very aware of its responsibil-
ity of market making and price maintenance, which can be seen in the debate 
about “backloading” allowances (EU Commission 2012). But there seems to 
remain an underestimation of the regulatory intensity that emission markets, 
and financial markets in general, entail, in order to secure something like “in-
formational justice”. This unconsciousness may be connected to the separation 
between the “inside” and the “outside” of the market. The “outside of the mar-
ket” is of the regulators business whereas the “inside” is not. Then, the organiz-
ing of the cap of overall emission rights belongs to the outside conditions of 
emission markets, whereas the question of informational justice – and what it 
takes to define a trading situation – rather belongs to the domain of trading 
itself, which has been left unregulated.  
5.  Conclusion 
The conventional formatting of the market is neglected in important and influ-
ential parts of economic theory and it is neglected in day-to-day and political 
language, which is even more important. The quasi-natural state of the market 
is deeply anchored in our language. If we speak about “the market” it seems 
that forces of nature broke upon us. It is as if words fail to grasp and to under-
stand. It is as if we are speechless and powerless against these forces and no 
one can be blamed guilty. If this is right, then the problem of market creation 
cannot be understood as a problem of critique and compromise-building, alone. 
Marketization, then, unfolds via pragmatic movements between active and 
compromising law creation into regimes of engagement where the world is not 
only objectified but also naturalized. In the work of Boltanski, naturalization is 
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a mode of action belonging to the regime of dispute in violence, since it ex-
cludes rules and conventions (Boltanski 2012).  
This neglecting of a regulatory dependency of markets is consequential. It 
leads to the paradox effect that the free-market hypothesis produces as an unin-
tended consequence, what it wants to avoid: bureaucracy. The law of emissions 
markets leaves its core function trading unregulated (as in this article has been 
shown for the EU Directive). Because the determination of the price for carbon 
is left over to the intelligence of the market, a need for investing in calculative 
forms at the company-level emanates. This is the reason why there is a substan-
tive causal relation between marketization and (private) bureaucratization. The 
law based on economic assumptions of market efficiency and general equilibri-
um leaves the “inside of the market” unregulated. This is compensated by an 
intensive regulation of the “outside of the market” and by private actors’ regu-
lative attempts at the “inside of the market.” Without rules and implements, 
actors are exposed to a rather high level of uncertainty. It leaves the economic 
actor with the impertinence of finding substitutes for the missing regulative 
certainty in carbon markets and makes them investing in forms of calculation 
and documentation. It can be concluded that emissions trading certainly raises 
the awareness for carbon at industrial sites, but it does not raise efficiency. It 
leads to bureaucratic attempts at the outside and at the inside of the market – 
along the theoretical separation between natural markets and artificial law. 
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